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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 970420-CA
Priority No. 2

JASON MARTINEZ,
Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from two convictions of aggravated
assault, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (1995).

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Should this Court review a jury instruction under
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant
purposefully did not object to the instruction and where the
instructions viewed as a whole correctly stated the elements of
the crime charged?
Standard of Review: An appellate court will not review a
jury instruction in the absence of a specific, distinct objection
below, unless necessary to avoid manifest injustice, that is,
plain error.

Utah R. Crim. Proc. 19(c) (1997); State v. Johnson,

774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996).

Plain error does not apply where counsel

consciously chooses not to object or leads the court into error.
State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied.
497 U.S. 1024 (1990).

To prevail under either a plain error or

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must also show
that any error prejudiced him.

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,

174 (Utah App. 1992).
Issue 2:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

allowing the State to call a witness not on its witness list
where defendant was prejudiced?
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a defendant's
requested relief for a discovery violation is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah

1987).
Issue 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
allowing the investigating detective to give an opinion regarding
how the crime occurred where the officer had extensive training
and experience in investigating violent crimes and where the
officer based his opinion on the physical evidence that he
personally observed and on the statements of eyewitnesses, all of
whom testified at trial?
Standard of Review: "A trial court has discretion in
determining whether a witness has adequate qualifications to
2

testify as an expert and in determining whether specific
testimony offered by an expert should be allowed or exceeds the
expert's qualifications."

Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1337

(Utah 1993) (citing to Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co,. 711
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following statutes and rules are contained
Addendum A:
Utah
Rule
Rule
Rule

Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996);
19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1997);
16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1997);
702, Utah Rules of Evidence (1997).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

An October 1995 information charged defendant, Jason
Martinez, with two counts of second degree felony aggravated
assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996),
based on the allegation that defendant inflicted serious bodily
injury on two victims (R. 06). A jury convicted defendant as
charged in November 1996 (R. 219-20).
Subsequently, defendant moved to arrest judgment or,
alternatively, to reduce his convictions to third degree felonies
on the ground that one of the jury instructions erroneously
allowed the jury to convict him by finding only that he had used
a dangerous weapon and not that he had inflicted serious bodily

3

injury1 (R. 233). The trial court granted defendant's motion by
reducing his two convictions to third degree felonies (R. 258,
259-60).

The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive prison

terms of zero-to-five years (R. 259-60; Tr. 703-04).
After obtaining new counsel, defendant moved for a new
trial, citing again to the alleged erroneous jury instruction and
asserting that he was unfairly prejudiced when the trial court
let the State call a witness not on the State's witness list (R.
269, 278) . The State countered with a request that the trial
court reinstate the original verdict of two second degree
felonies (R. 307-09).

The trial court denied both defendant's

motion for a new trial and the State's request for reinstatement
of the original verdict (R. 332).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 334).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant stabbed his two unarmed victims in the back,
causing one, a hemophiliac, permanent partial paralysis and the
other permanent nerve damage to his right arm and shoulder.

The

following details are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict.

State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996).

*A person who commits aggravated assault by using a
dangerous weapon, but who does not inflict serious bodily injury,
is guilty of a third degree felony, whereas an assault, with or
without a weapon, that results in an intentional infliction of
serious bodily injury is a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996).
4

Defendant's

brother Eloy starts

a fight

In September 1995, Melissa Hernandez threw a keg party at
her home in south Salt Lake County (Tr. 57, 163, 229, 473-74).
After paying a five dollar cover charge, guests were given a
sixteen ounce cup from they could drink all the beer they wanted
(Tr. 182, 507, 575) .
Brandon Gilger arrived at the party at about 9:30 p.m. with
his friends Anthony Esparza and John Montoya (Tr. 58, 229, 296).
Defendant arrived at about 11:00 p.m. with his older brother Eloy
and four friends, including Kevin Lopez (Tr. 59, 487-88, 506,
573-74).

Because defendant and Eloy had been fishing earlier in

the day, defendant had fishing equipment in his car, including a
buck knife which he kept in a tool box (Tr. 573).
At the party, Eloy, defendant, and others in their group
became loud and intimidating (Tr. 59-60, 87-89, 90, 92, 299, 30607, 319). Eloy, who was quite intoxicated, became angry at Kevin
Lopez and, while backing Lopez into a corner, began to egg Lopez
on to hit him2 (Tr. 62, 488-89, 508, 532, 576). When another
guest interceded by telling Eloy to "chill out," Eloy slugged him
in the face (Tr. 489, 493, 508, 541, 577).
Melissa Hernandez told Eloy and his group to leave and, when
they would not, began yelling "Help get them out!" (Tr. 61, 63,

2

Eloy drank about a six pack before coming to the party and
then drank about another six pack at the party (Tr. 532, 552).
5

94-95, 311, 475). Eloy, defendant, and his friends were then
pushed out through the kitchen door and into the garage (Tr. 61,
94-95, 475, 542, 578). Responding to the noise and Ms.
Hernandez' cries, twenty to twenty-five of the other guests
crowded into the garage to see what was happening (Tr. 61, 63-64,
94-95, 167, 169, 187, 189, 297).
A semi-circle formed around defendant and Eloy who, because
of the increasing crowd, had been pushed toward the garage door
(Tr. 64, 95, 190). By then Eloy and John Montoya were exchanging
words and Eloy punched Montoya in the face
70, 197, 231, 248-49).

(Tr. 64, 122-24, 168-

The two continued to yell at each other

while their friends restrained them (Tr. 63, 103, 170). At one
point during the altercation, defendant stepped between the two
and said, "Don't make me go to my car and get a gun" (Tr. 65,
108, 124-25, 327). Although Brandon Gilger observed this
altercation, he did not get involved or participate in any way
because he is a hemophiliac and did not want to risk an injury
(Tr. 60, 62, 64, 65, 95-97, 99).
Continuing to yell "get them out," Melissa Hernandez opened
the garage door and everyone spilled out onto the driveway (Tr.
65-66, 99, 129-30, 192, 231). Shouting continued between Eloy,
defendant, and the other guests until, provoked by something Eloy
said, several guests began to chase Eloy (Tr. 170-72, 200, 215) .
Both Eloy and defendant ran into the street, turned right, ran to

6

the corner, and then ran across the street to the Morrison home
(Tr. 66-68, 199, 536, 546, 584, 611, State's Ex. 1). Most of the
guests stopped once they reached the middle of the street,
however, about five or six guests continued to pursue Eloy to the
Morrison's driveway (Tr. 102, 107, 172, 200, 215).
Eloy and Montoya continued their altercation as they moved
towards the Morrison's driveway (Tr. 69-70, 101). At one point,
Montoya, who had been running backwards and facing Eloy, fell in
the street with Eloy falling on top of him (Tr. 69, 101). Both
immediately got up and Eloy continued to run (Tr. 69, 547,
State's Ex. 1). Someone ripped Eloy's shirt off him (Tr. 586).

Defendant

stabs

Gilger

and Montoya in the back

Concerned that the party was out of control, Gilger decided
to leave (Tr. 72). However, because Gilger had brought Montoya
to the party, he and Justin Rowley walked across the street to
ask Montoya to leave with them (Tr. 5, 106, 114, 129, 172).
Gilger determined that if Montoya would not come, he would leave
without him (Tr. 106).
Gilger reached the Morrison's driveway and saw Montoya
walking towards him (Tr. 71, 1047, 174). Gilger said, "Let's
go," to Montoya and turned to leave (Tr. 72-73, 174). Gilger had
taken no more than a few steps when defendant suddenly came
running up behind him and stabbed him in the back (Tr. 73, 104,
174, 236). Gilger immediately fell to the ground (Tr. 73, 174,
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222, 236) .
Thinking that Gilger had only been hit with a fist, Rowley
encouraged him to get up (Tr. 174) . Just as Rowley realized that
Gilger had been stabbed, he heard Montoya calling his name (Tr.
175, 203, 211, 222). Rowley turned to see Montoya on the ground,
face down, supporting himself with one hand (Tr. 175, 203, 207,
222).

Defendant was bending over Montoya and Rowley watched as

defendant stabbed Montoya twice in the back or shoulder (Tr. 175,
203, 207, 222) .3
Anthony Esparza, who was standing across the street in the
Hernandez yard, saw defendant stab Gilger from behind and flee
(Tr. 238) . Esparza chased defendant down the street, but
defendant escaped when a car stopped and picked him up (Tr. 245).
Meanwhile, Eloy ran up to Gilger as he lay on the ground, and
stated, "See what you get for fucking with us Martinez boys?
what you get?"

See

(Tr. 109, 130).

Neither Gilger nor Montoya were armed or engaged in any kind
of a confrontation with defendant or Eloy at the time defendant

3

There was conflicting testimony regarding whom defendant
stabbed first. Montoya testified that defendant stabbed him
first and that Montoya watched as defendant stabbed Gilger (Tr.
301). Gilger testified that after defendant stabbed him he fell
and turned in time to see defendant running, however, he could
not see what had happened to Montoya during that time (Tr. 7375). Defendant testified that he first stabbed Montoya and then
stabbed Gilger (Tr. 598). Justin Rowley was the only person who
testified that he actually saw defendant stabbing Montoya after
Gilger had been stabbed.
8

stabbed them (Tr. 129, 173, 174, 177, 238, 301). The single stab
wound to Gilger's back partially severed his spinal column (Tr.
504).

As a result, Gilger suffered permanent partial paralysis;

he cannot run and can walk only with the aid of a cane (Tr. 7880).

Gilger also lost all feeling on his left side and control

over his bowel and bladder (Tr. 79).
Montoya received four stab wounds, two of them behind the
right shoulder and the other two in his back right flank (Tr.
223, 321, 341, 387, 389). The knife cut the arteries and nerves
in Montoya's right arm (Tr. 303). As a result, Montoya will
never regain full use of his right shoulder and he cannot pick up
heavy objects with his fingers (Tr. 303).
Significantly, neither Montoya nor Gilger had any wounds on
the front of their bodies or any defensive wounds on their hands,
feet, or other extremities (Tr. 387-88).

The witnesses were

nearly unanimous that other than defendant's knife, there were no
weapons or implements that could be or were being used as weapons'
4

Defense witness Mark Delgado was the only witness to
testify that he saw any weapons (Tr. 510, 520). He claimed to
have seen two or three bats and several bricks in the Hernandez
home during the party (Tr. 510, 520). Delgado also stated that
he saw Eloy get hit with a brick and tackled by a crowd of people
who kicked and beat Eloy with baseball bats (Tr. 525). That
testimony, however, was contradicted by all the other witnesses,
including Eloy who testified that although he fell down, no one
tackled him, beat him, or kicked him (Tr. 540-41, 547, 549).
Eloy did claim that some people threw rocks at him, but denied
that he was ever hit by anything (Tr. 538, 549, 553). Even
defendant conceded that he never saw anyone else wield a weapon
and that he did not see any bricks, baseball bats, or rocks being
9

(Tr. 69, 70, 169, 179, 215, 240, 291-92, 304, 353, 355, 452, 482,
483) .

Defendant

lies

to

police

After fleeing the crime scene, defendant went to his
girlfriend's apartment where he changed his clothes (Tr. 394-95,
595, 97). Later that day, defendant met with Detective Keith
Stephens (Tr. 391-92).

Although defendant admitted that he had

been at the party and had been chased away, he denied having
stabbed or otherwise injured anyone (Tr. 393). Detective
Stephens repeatedly suggested to defendant that it would be
difficult to change his story later, even to claim self-defense,
but defendant continued to deny that he had stabbed anyone (Tr.
393-940, 605).
Defendant gave Detective Stephens permission to retrieve his
clothing from his girlfriend's apartment, but when the detective
arrived there the girlfriend was unable to find the clothing
where defendant claimed to have put it (Tr. 395-96).

Defendant

did not produce the sweatshirt he had been wearing that night

used or thrown, although he did claim that while running he felt
something whiz past his ear which he surmised to be a club or
pipe (Tr. 610, 612, 621).
Police who arrived on the scene only minutes after the
stabbings found no evidence of any bricks or rocks being thrown
or baseball bats being used to hit anyone (Tr. 351-53, 355, 368) .
Furthermore, Detective Stephens testified that when he
interviewed Eloy and defendant on the day of the altercation, he
did not observe any injuries on either one that might have been
caused by a weapon or being hit by a brick (Tr. 372, 413, 45152) .
10

until the preliminary hearing (Tr. 397).
In July 1996, seven months after the stabbings and five
months after his preliminary hearing, defendant and his attorney
met with Detective Stephens at the crime scene to discuss
defendant's version of the events (Tr. 388). At that time,
defendant admitted for the first time that he had committed the
stabbings, but claimed that it was in self-defense (Tr. 398).
At trial, defendant testified that he took his fishing knife
into the party with him (Tr. 578). Defendant also stated that he
drew the knife in the garage and held it in his right hand when
the other guests were confronting him and Eloy (Tr. 606-07).
Defendant did not explain why no one else in the garage saw the
knife then, or how he was able to hold his brother back with his
right hand, as he claimed to do, while holding the knife (Tr.
543-44, 606-07).5

5

The State's theory was that defendant retrieved the knife
from his car after the trouble started (Tr. 680). This theory
contradicts defendant's self-defense theory because if defendant
had retrieved the knife from the car he could easily have escaped
without inflicting any harm.
The State's theory was supported by the fact that neither
Eloy, nor anyone else, noticed the knife until the stabbings (Tr.
179, 497, 543-44). Furthermore, after going fishing that
morning, Eloy and defendant attended their brother's wedding (Tr.
572). After returning from the wedding, defendant gathered his
friends and Eloy to go the Hernandez party (Tr. 572-74). The
jury could have reasonably believed that it was unlikely that
defendant would carry a large fishing knife in his pocket to his
brother's wedding and then to the party. Defendant also
initially testified that he kept the knife in a tool box in his
car (Tr. 573) . In addition, Gilger testified that several months
after the stabbings, Kevin Lopez told him that defendant had
11

Although defendant claimed that about fifteen people chased
him and Eloy into the street, he conceded that there were only
five or six people in the general area of the stabbings (Tr.
600).

He also admitted that although he initially feared for

Eloy's safety, he believed that Eloy had escaped before the
stabbings (Tr. 589).
Defendant testified that when he started to make his own
escape, he came face-to-face with Montoya, who charged at him and
tried to wrestle him to the ground (Tr. 591-92, 620). Defendant
asserted that while he was falling backward with Montoya on top,
defendant reached his right hand around and behind Montoya's left
side, and stabbed Montoya several times in his right shoulder and
right lower back (Tr. 622-23).

Defendant maintained that he

continued to inflict wounds on Montoya's right side as defendant
was falling backwards and that he stopped only after Montoya fell
off him (Tr. 593, 624) .
Defendant testified that after he stabbed Montoya, he turned
to flee but saw six people, including Gilger, approaching him
(Tr. 593-94, 625). Rather than turning and running the other
way, defendant ran through the six young men, stabbing Gilger

admitted to Lopez that he had gotten the knife from the car (Tr.
635). Although the trial court admitted this testimony only to
impeach Lopez's denial of this statement, it was nevertheless
admissible as substantive evidence as a prior inconsistent
statement under rule 801(d)(1)(A). See Kimball & Boyce, Utah
Evidence Law 8-15 to 8-17 (1996); State v. Ramsey. 782 P.2d 480,
483-84 (Utah 1989) (plurality opinion).
12

once in the back as he did so (Tr. 593-94, 625-26, 627).
Defendant asserted that he feared for his life at the time
of the stabbings, but conceded that both victims were unarmed at
the time of the attack and that he never saw any weapons or
anyone throwing anything at Eloy or himself (Tr. 621, 625).
Defendant admitted that he lied to Detective Stephens when he
denied having stabbed anyone (Tr. 596).

Justin Rowley allowed to

testify

Defendant made a timely discovery request for a list of all
the witnesses that the State intended to call at trial (R. 13,
25).

Approximately ten days before trial, the prosecutor became

aware for the first time that Justin Rowley was a potential
witness for the State (Tr. 9, 11, 13). However, the prosecutor
did not immediately inform defendant of Rowley's existence
because the prosecutor did not have an address for Rowley or know
how to contact him (Tr. 9, 13).
Trial was scheduled to begin on Tuesday, November 12, 1998
(Tr. 6). Late afternoon on the Thursday before trial, the
prosecutor learned how Rowley might be contacted (Tr. 9, 10).
The following day, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., the prosecutor
personally faxed a notice that he intended to call Rowley as a
witness because he had just realized that his secretary had
failed to so earlier as he had requested (Tr. 7-8).
The Monday before trial was a holiday, however, defense

13

counsel had seen the notice by then because he call Detective
Stephens to inquire about Rowley (Tr. 14). The prosecutor was
unable to speak with Rowley until the morning of trial to see
whether the State could actually use him as a witness (Tr, 8,
12).
Immediately prior to trial, defendant asked the Court to
exclude Rowley as a witness (Tr. 11). Defendant claimed that the
lack of timely notice made it impossible for him to "check into
[Rowley's] background, history, any false statements he's made in
the past on loan applications or rental applications or anything
of that nature" (Tr. 11).
The trial court denied defendant's request to exclude
Rowley's testimony, but ordered the State to turn over any
information it had on Rowley's background, including any criminal
history (Tr. 22-23).

The State disclosed that Rowley had three

prior convictions, one for misdemeanor theft and two for
marijuana possession (Tr. 24, 151). Defendant asked that Rowley
not be allowed to testify until the following day so that he
would have time to investigate the underlying facts for the theft
conviction to see if it could be used to impeach Rowley (Tr. 26).
Agreeing that defendant was entitled to explore that information,
the trial court stated its willingness to give defendant time to
obtain Rowley's files, but suggested that it would be more
expeditious for defendant to simply voir dire Rowley regarding

14

the prior conviction (Tr. 26-27).
The second day of trial, defense counsel was provided a copy
of Rowley's "rap sheet" and allowed to question Rowley regarding
his prior convictions (Tr. 152-56).

Subsequently, the trial

court determined that the theft conviction did not go to Rowley's
credibility (Tr. 156). Defendant did not question Rowley about
the substance of his proposed testimony (Tr. 152-56).

Defendant

unsuccessfully renewed his objection to Rowley's testifying on
the ground that the prosecutor knew of the witness for at least
ten days before trial and could have given more notice (Tr. 156).
Once Rowley testified, defendant vigorously cross-examined
him regarding his biases, how much he had to drink, and the
accuracy of his recollection (Tr. 181-84, 204-07, 226).
Detective Stephens'

testimony

After Gilger, Rowley, Esparza, and Montoya testified, the
State called Detective Keith Stephens, a fifteen-year veteran of
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department (Tr. 364). Detective
Stephens who was on his department's homicide unit had been
assigned to investigate this case

(Tr. 364).

Detective Stephens testified that he had personally viewed
the crime scene and both victims' wounds (Tr. 373, 384, 385). He
also interviewed the victims, defendant and his brother, and
other witnesses (Tr. 369-72, 392-94, 401, 407-09).
Using State's Exhibit 1, a diagram of the area where the

15

stabbing occurred, and various photos introduced as State's
exhibits, the detective showed the jury where Gilger collapsed on
the lower part of the Morrison's driveway (Tr. 373-74, 381,
State's Ex. Nos. 3, 4, 8, 9, 13). Detective Stephens also used
several photos to point out a trail of blood that began in the
Morrison's driveway above where Gilger collapsed and wove down
the driveway towards and then away from Gilger and down the
sidewalk (Tr. 373-74, 381, 383-84, 410, 464-65, State's Ex. Nos.
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13). The trail ended in a large pool of
blood where Montoya had collapsed on the sidewalk several feet
from the Morrison's driveway (Tr. 381, 383-84, 464-65, State's
Ex. Nos. 10, 12) .
Over defendant's objection, the trial court allowed
Detective Stephens to give his opinion on how the crime occurred
(Tr. 381-82).

Based on the physical evidence he observed at the

crime scene, the victim's wounds, and the witness accounts of
Gilger, Montoya, Esparza, Rowley, defendant, and Eloy, the
detective testified that he believed that defendant first stabbed
Montoya in the back in the Morrison's driveway near their garage
(Tr. 383). The detective then testified that Montoya began
walking away, thereby explaining the blood trail (Tr. 383-84).
Based on Gilger's and Rowley's testimony that they could not see
where defendant came from, the detective believed that defendant
then ran around a camper truck parked in the driveway and stabbed
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Gilger in the back (Tr. 383) . According to the detective,
defendant then ran past Montoya a second time (Tr. 383). This
supported Rowley's testimony that after Gilger was stabbed, he
saw defendant bending over and stabbing a fallen Montoya.6
The detective also testified that the wounds the victims
suffered were puncture wounds, all to the back, and that neither
the victims nor defendant had any defensive wounds (Tr. 387-88,
451).
Defendant objected to this testimony on the ground that the
detective was not qualified as a blood spatter or accident
reconstructionist and because his opinion was based on hearsay
(Tr. 380-381).
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument
sections below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I; Jury Instruction.

Trial counsel's affidavit states

that he consciously decided to not object to Instruction 16 to
avoid annoying the jury and in the hope that the "plain error"
contained in the instruction would later benefit defendant on

6

The detective based his opinion in part on Montoya's and
defendant's testimony that Montoya had been stabbed first and
Gilger second (Tr. 383, 384, 403). Using the blood trail as a
guide, the detective was able to pinpoint where Montoya stood
when he was stabbed (Tr. 383). The detective's testimony that
defendant ran towards and passed Montoya a second time is based
on Rowley's testimony and its consistency with the physical
evidence (Tr. 415).
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appeal if convicted.

This conscious choice amounted to invited

error, thereby foreclosing appellate review under the plain error
doctrine.

In any event, although partially erroneous,

Instruction 16 was harmless when viewed as a whole with the
remaining instructions.
Point II; Discovery Violation.

The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing the State to call a witness not
on its witness list because the defendant has not made the
requisite credible argument that the discovery violation impaired
his defense.

Moreover, in view of the overwhelming evidence

negating defendant's self-defense claim, any error in allowing
the witness to testify was harmless.
Point III: Expert Testimony.

Detective Stephens was

qualified by virtue of his extensive training and experience to
testify to give an opinion as to how the crime occurred, based on
the physical evidence personally observed by him and on the incourt testimony of eyewitnesses.

Contrary to defendant's

assertions, the detective's opinion was not based wholly on
hearsay, but was based on his personal observations of the
physical evidence and on the testimony and evidence before the
jury.

Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing the detective to testify as an expert.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO
NOT OBJECT TO INSTRUCTION 16, PLAIN ERROR DOES NOT
APPLY; ADDITIONALLY, DEFENDANT DID NOT MEET THE
REQUISITE PREJUDICE PRONG UNDER EITHER PLAIN ERROR OR
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE THE
INSTRUCTIONS, WHEN VIEWED AS A WHOLE, DID NOT CONFUSE
THE JURY.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (Supp. 1996) provides:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a
violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
An assault under subsection (1)(a) is a second degree felony,
whereas an assault under (1)(b) is a third degree felony.
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2)& (3).

Utah

In this case, defendant was charged

with two counts of second degree felony aggravated assault on the
theory that he caused serious bodily injury to Montoya and Gilger
(R. 06-07) .
Defendant challenges the giving of Instruction 16, which
states:
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person
commits assault and (a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
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injury.7
(Tr. 200; Addendum B).

Defendant characterizes this instruction

as a lesser-included offense instruction that allowed the jury to
convict him of aggravated assault without being unanimous as to
whether he committed a second degree felony by intentionally
inflicting serious bodily injury or a third degree felony by
using a dangerous weapon likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.

Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. App.] 21.

Although defendant did not object to this instruction below,
he asks this Court to excuse his failure under the doctrine of
plain error or under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The plain error doctrine, however, does not apply here because
trial counsel, by his own admission, consciously chose not to
object, thereby inviting the complained-of error.

Furthermore,

defendant cannot establish that the giving of the instruction was
prejudicial error for purposes of either plain error or
ineffective assistance of counsel because, when viewed as a
whole, the instructions clearly explained to the jury that to
convict defendant, it must first unanimously find that he
inflicted serious bodily injury on his two victims.

7

Both in his motion to arrest judgment and in his appellate
brief, defendant cites to Instruction 15 as the erroneous
instruction (R. 233, Br. App. 13-14, Addendum III) . However, the
complained-of instruction as given to the jury is actually
Instruction 16 (R. 200).
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A. Defendant invited the complained-of error, thereby making the
plain error doctrine inapplicable.
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, precludes a
party from challenging a jury instruction on appeal unless he
makes a specific and distinct objection before the jury is
instructed or the review is necessary "to avoid a manifest
injustice."

The standard for determining whether to review a

claim under rule 19(c) for manifest injustice is that of plain
error.

State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996); State

v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989); State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
The plain error doctrine "exists to permit review of trial
court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant from the harm
that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel."
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989).

State v.

That doctrine does not

apply, however, when "a party through counsel has made a
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial
court into error."

Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158; see also State

v.Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996); State v. Hall, 946 P.2d
712, 716 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1211
(Utah App. 1991).

The purpose of this rule, known as "invited

error," is to give the trial court the first opportunity to
correct any errors and to discourage parties from "intentionally
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for
reversal on appeal." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109.
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Here, defense counsel, by his own admission, led the trial
court into error by consciously deciding to not object to
Instruction 16. After being convicted, defendant moved the trial
court to either arrest judgment or to reduce his convictions to
third degree felonies on the ground that Instruction 16 may have
confused the jury and allowed it to convict him on the sole
finding that he used a dangerous weapon (R. 233). The trial
court agreed and reduced defendant's convictions to third degree
felonies (R. 258, 259-60).
Defendant subsequently obtained new counsel and moved for a
new trial, again on the ground that Instruction 16 improperly
allowed the jury convict him without being unanimous on whether
his conduct constituted a second or third degree felony (R. 269,
279-80, 282-86).

Defendant claimed that his attorney was

ineffective for not objecting to Instruction 16 (R. 289-91).

To

support his contention, defendant attached an affidavit from his
trial counsel stating that he had objected to Instruction 16 off
the record in chambers and that he was led to understand the
instruction would not be given (R. 293; a copy of the affidavit
is included in Addendum C).

Counsel also claimed that both

parties were then given the opportunity to place their objections
to any of the instructions on the record (R. 294). According to
trial counsel, he did not object to Instruction 16 on the record
because he believed that it had already been settled that it
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would not be given8 (R. 294) .
The affidavit then stated that when the trial court began
reading the instructions to the jury, defense counsel
"immediately noted a problem and flipped to Instruction No. [16]"
(Addendum C, 294). Defense counsel averred that although he knew
then that the instruction should not have been included, he
nevertheless decided "to wait until the instructions were
complete for a more opportune time to advise the Court of the
error" (Addendum C, 294-95).

Based on "the vibes of the jury,"

counsel believed an objection at that point would cause jurors to
resent defendant (Addendum C, 294-95).

Defense counsel explained

his failure to subsequently ask for a curative instruction as
follows:
I do not recall whether I failed to ask for a curative
instruction because I felt
that interrupting
would cause bad
feelings
against
the defense by the jurors
and that the
error was not of great significance to our self defense
theory, whether I simply overlooked the error once we were
into closing arguments, whether I made a split
second
decision
not to object because the error was plain and would
benefit
my client
in the event of an adverse verdictf
or
because of a combination
of the
above.
(Addendum C, 295) (emphasis added).
As evidenced by the foregoing, although trial counsel
8

Because there is no record of what occurred in chambers,
defense counsel's affidavit contains the only allegation of what
occurred there. The State does not concede or agree with defense
counsel's version of what happened in chambers. Nevertheless,
because, as demonstrated below, defense counsel invited error by
consciously deciding not to object, whether he objected to the
instruction off the record is beside the point.
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believed that Instruction 16 was erroneous, he purposefully chose
not to make a timely objection because he believed that doing so
would cause the jury to view his client unfavorably.

Trial

counsel then purposefully failed to ask for a curative
instruction because he decided that the error would not have a
significant impact on defendant's self-defense theory and because
he made a "split second decision" not to object in the hope that
the "plain error" would later benefit defendant on appeal if
convicted.9

And, in fact, trial counsel later capitalized on

Instruction 16 by using it to convince the trial court that it
should reduce defendant's convictions to third degree felonies.
Trial counsel's failure to object so that he could preserve
a hidden ground for post-trial or appellate relief is exactly the
kind of conscious decision that the invited error doctrine seeks
to prevent.

See Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159.

Consequently, this

Court should decline to review defendant's claim under the plain
error doctrine.

^hile it is true that defense counsel also implied that the
failure to ask for a curative instruction might have been an
oversight, the primary thrust of his affidavit is that he
consciously chose not to object because he did not want to annoy
the jury and because he believed that allowing the error would
ultimately benefit his client.
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B. Even if the plain error doctrine did apply, defendant has not
shown that the instruction was prejudicial.
Even if the plain error doctrine did apply, defendant has
not shown that Instruction 16 amounted to plain error.

To obtain

a review under plain error, an appellant must show that 1) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and 2) the
error was harmful, i.e., that absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different.
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208; Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109; Verde, 770
P.2d at 122-23; State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App.
1992).
Assuming, arguendo,

that defendant could meet the first

requirement, he cannot meet the second.

Defendant claims that

Instruction 16 denied him a unanimous jury verdict because it
essentially asked the jury "to consider convicting [him] on a
lesser [aggravated assault by using a dangerous weapon], but not
an included offense."

Br. App. at 21.

Defendant asserts that

the instruction was prejudicial because if it had not been given,
the jury would have acquitted him because of his "consistent"
claim of self-defense.

Br. App. at 27.

Defendant mischaracterizes the nature and intent of
Instruction 16. That instruction is not a lesser-included
offense instruction, nor does it operate as one.

It does not

tell the jury that it may convict defendant of aggravated assault
if it finds that defendant used a dangerous weapon.
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Rather, it

merely sets forth the general statutory definition of aggravated
assault.

Unfortunately, in addition to the definition of the

charged crime of second degree felony aggravated assault, the
instruction also erroneously includes the definition of third
degree felony aggravated assault, which was not charged.
The error, however, was harmless when viewed with all the
other instructions.

See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah

1981) (jury instructions are not to be viewed singly, but must be
considered and construed as a whole); State v. Laine, 618 P.2d
33, 35 (Utah 1980) (same).

Immediately following Instruction 16,

were two elements instructions that clearly and correctly stated
the elements of second degree felony assault.

Instruction 17

instructed the jury that before it could convict defendant of
Count I, it had to find each of the following elements:
1. That on or about September 23, 1995, in Salt Lake
County, Utah, the defendant, Jason Joe Martinez, assaulted
Brandon Gilger; and
2. That the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily
injury to Brandon Gilger.
(R. 201) (emphasis added).

That instruction did not mention

anything about using a dangerous weapon.

Similarly, Instruction

18 told the jury that before it could convict defendant of Count
II, it must find that defendant assaulted and
inflicted

serious

bodily

injury

intentionally

on Montoya (R. 202). Again,

there was no mention of the use of a dangerous weapon (R. 202).
Likewise, Instruction 1 set forth verbatim the information,
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alleging that defendant committed aggravated assault "by
intentionally causing serious bodily injury" to Brandon Gilger
and Robert Montoya (R. 185). This instruction also did not
mention anything about a dangerous weapon.

Another instruction

informed the jury that it should not single out any sentence or
individual point in the instructions, but that it should
"consider the instructions as a whole, and . . . regard each in
the light of all others" (R. 187). The jury also received an
instruction that it must be unanimous in its verdict (R. 216).
(Instructions 1, 3, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 32 are contained in
Addendum B.)

In sum, the only instruction out of thirty-two that

even mentioned the dangerous weapon element of third degree
felony aggravated assault was Instruction No. 16.
The harmlessness of Instruction 16 is supported by the
prosecutor's closing argument where he carefully explained to the
jury that to find defendant guilty, it had to first find that
defendant assaulted Gilger and Montoya and that defendant

"intentionally

caused serious

bodily

injury

both as to [Gilger]

and as to [Montoya]" (Tr. 647). The prosecutor never argued or
implied that the jury could convict defendant if they only found
that defendant used a dangerous weapon (Tr. 645-48).
Contrary to defendant's assertions, it is also unlikely that
the jury would have acquitted him if Instruction 16 had not been
given.

Defendant never disputed that he stabbed the victims,
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that he used a dangerous weapon to do so, o,r that he caused
serious bodily injury.

The only disputed issue at trial was

whether defendant acted in self-defense.

If the jury had

believed defendant's claim of self-defense it would have had to
acquit him, regardless of whether he inflicted serious bodily
injury or merely used a dangerous weapon.10
In short, it is unlikely that the jury misunderstood the
instructions and found defendant guilty without first unanimously
finding that he intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury on
his two victims.

See, e.g.. State v. Carlson, 934 P.2d 657, 661

(Utah App. 1997) (erroneous instruction allowing jury to infer
that defendant actually stole vehicle when he was only charged
with possession of a stolen vehicle was harmless error where
remaining instructions clearly informed jury that defendant was
charged only with possession of stolen vehicle and gave only
elements of that crime).

Defendant, therefore, cannot show that

the giving of Instruction 16 was prejudicial.
C. Trial counsel was not ineffective because defendant cannot
show prejudice.
Defendant also seeks review of Instruction 16 under an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

10

A claim based on

Indeed, defendant obtained more than he was entitled to
when he convinced the trial court to reduce his convictions to
third degree felonies. As stated, it is highly unlikely that the
jury did not unanimously find both that defendant inflicted
serious bodily injury and that he used a dangerous weapon as both
those points were undisputed.
28

ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on
appeal presents a question of law.
590, 593 (Utah App. 1995).

State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d

To establish ineffective assistance

of counsel, defendant must overcome a strong presumption that his
counsel's representation met an objective standard of
reasonableness and that but for the identified omissions or acts
of trial counsel, there was a "reasonable probability" of a more
favorable outcome.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688,

694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984); State v. Ellifritz. 835
P.2d 170, 173 (Utah App. 1992).
A common standard applies to both plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel in that "[f]ailure to meet the
plain error requirement of prejudice means that defendant
likewise fails to meet the required showing under the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard."

Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174

(citing to Verde. 770 P.2d at 124 n.15).

As stated, defendant

has failed show that he was prejudiced by Instruction 16 when it
is viewed in the context of all the other instructions,
particularly the elements instructions.

Defendant, therefore,

has not shown that he was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING JUSTIN ROWLEY TO TESTIFY BECAUSE
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MADE A CREDIBLE ARGUMENT THAT
HIS DEFENSE WAS IMPAIRED BY THE LACK OF TIMELY
NOTICE; EVEN IF DEFENDANT HAD RECEIVED TIMELY
NOTICE, THERE IS NOT A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A
DIFFERENT OUTCOME.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in allowing Justin Rowley to testify.

Br. App. 30-31.

Defendant

asserts that Rowley's testimony that defendant stabbed Gilger
first and Montoya second completely changed the State's theory of
the case and that defendant was unable to effectively meet this
damaging testimony.

Br. App. 31-32.

Defendant, however, has not

alleged, much less shown, how his defense was impaired by the
delayed notice.

Moreover, defendant's claim of prejudice is

belied by the abundant evidence outside of Rowley's testimony
that defendant did not act in self-defense.
A. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying
requested relief for a discovery violation unless defendant first
makes a credible argument that the discovery violation impaired
his defense, and it is shown that the discovery violation was
prejudicial.
Rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that
if a trial court becomes aware that a party has failed to comply
with discovery rules, "the court may order such party to permit
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances."
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In

this case, the prosecutor, albeit unintentionally, violated the
discovery rules by not notifying defendant sooner that Rowley was
a possible witness.
However, under rule 16(g), a trial court has "ample power to
obviate any prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal
discovery rules."

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah

1987); see also State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989).
Under this rule, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a
defendant's requested relief only when "taking into account any
remedial measures ordered by the trial court," the defendant is
prejudiced and "the remedial measure requested but refused would
have obviated this prejudice."

Kniaht, 734 P.2d at 918, 921.

Furthermore, to constitute reversible error, there must be a
reasonable likelihood that without the prosecutor's error there
would have been a more favorable result for the defendant.11

Id.

at 919, 921. A "mere possibility" of a different outcome is not
enough, rather the "likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."

Id.

at 920.
To prevail on a claim of prejudice for a rule 16 discovery
n

It is important to note that the test for determining
prejudice for a discovery violation is whether there is a
sufficient likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of
the prosecutor's
failure to comply with rule 16. It is not
whether there is a sufficient likelihood of a different outcome
if the trial court's ruling had been different. Kniaht. 734 P.2d
at 920-21.
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violation, the defendant must first make a credible argument that
he was impaired by the prosecutor's failure to timely disclose
the requested material.

Id. at 921. Only then does the State

have the burden to persuade the court that absent the discovery
violation, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the outcome
of the trial would have been favorable for the defendant.

Id.

B. Defendant has not made a credible argument that the
prosecutor's delayed notice impaired his defense.
In this case, defendant has not made a credible argument
that the lack of notice that Rowley would testify impaired his
defense.

On appeal, defendant does not state how he would have

changed his defense or strategy or how he would have been better
prepared to meet Rowley's testimony had he been notified ten or
more days earlier that Rowley was going to testify.
argues only that the testimony

Defendant

of Rowley was prejudicial and

makes the bald assertion that he was unable to effectively
confront this testimony.

Br. App. 31-32.

Absent at least a

specific allegation how more notice would have better prepared
him to cross-examine Rowley, defendant has not made the requisite
credible showing.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in permitting Rowley to testify.
C. Absent the discovery violation, there is not a reasonable
likelihood that the outcome at trial would have been different.
Even assuming that a credible showing has been made that the
defense was impaired by the untimely notice, there is not a
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reasonable likelihood that absent the prosecutor's error the
outcome at trial would have been different.
Defendant essentially asserts that Rowley's testimony
completely changed the State's theory of the case and that he was
not prepared to meet this testimony.

Br. App. 30-32.

Defendant

bases this assertion on the fact that Rowley was the only witness
who testified that he watched as defendant stabbed Gilger first
and Montoya second while Montoya was falling to the ground.

Br.

App. 30. This testimony allowed the State to argue that
defendant actually stabbed Montoya first, Gilger second, and then
returned to stab Montoya a second time12 (Tr. 4 64, 653).
Although Rowley's testimony was certainly damaging to
defendant's self-defense theory, it did not result in a complete
change in the State's theory of the case.

The State's theory was

always that defendant intentionally stabbed his victims and that
he did not act in self-defense.

Rowley's testimony merely

provided additional evidence to the already overwhelming evidence
that defendant did not act in self-defense.
As already noted, the real issue here is not whether
Rowley's testimony

was prejudicial; it is whether the defendant

could have achieved a different outcome if he had had more notice
that Rowley would testify.

In other words, would defendant have

,2

The rest of Rowley's testimony was cumulative to that of
the other witnesses.
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been more likely to convince the jury that he acted in selfdefense had he known earlier of Rowley's testimony.
A review of the entire record makes clear that even if
Rowley had not testified, it is unlikely that the jury would have
found that defendant acted in self-defense.

First, all the stab

wounds were to the back (Tr. 73, 78-80, 223, 236, 238, 303, 321,
504).

Indeed, Montoya was stabbed four times in the back of

right shoulder and lower back, thereby negating a suggestion that
defendant used only the force reasonably necessary to protect
himself (Tr. 303, 321). Neither of the victims nor defendant or
his brother had any defensive wounds (Tr. 387-88, 451). The stab
wounds themselves were puncture wounds as opposed to the slashing
wounds one would expect if defendant had acted in self-defense
(Tr. 385-87).

The evidence was nearly uncontroverted that

defendant was the only person at the party with a weapon.13
Defendant himself admitted that neither Gilger nor Montoya had
weapons (Tr. 621, 625). Defendant's self-serving testimony was
the only evidence that Gilger and Montoya were threatening him
(Tr. 591-92, 620, 593-94, 625). All other witnesses to the
actual stabbing testified that neither Gilger nor Montoya
threatened or approached defendant (Tr. 60-66, 72-73, 99, 174,
236, 238). Defendant's own story that he had inflicted four
puncture knife wounds to Montoya's right shoulder and flank by

13

See note 6,

supra.
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reaching his right hand around Montoya's left side as defendant
fell was unbelievable and not supported by the physical evidence
at trial14 (Tr. 591-92, 620-23).

The jury was also unlikely to

believe that Gilger, a hemophiliac, would risk his life by
intentionally getting involved in an altercation with defendant.
Finally, defendant initially lied to police and tried to cover-up
his involvement in the stabbings, claiming self-defense for the
first time several months later (Tr. 395-96-88, 596).
In sum, given the overwhelming evidence that defendant did
not act in self-defense, even if defendant could have rebutted
Rowley's testimony that he stabbed Gilger first and Montoya
second, it is highly unlikely that the outcome would have been
different.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in allowing Rowley to testify.

14

For example, such a scenario would have likely resulted in
slashing wounds to Montoya's back instead of the puncture wounds
he actually suffered. Additionally, if Montoya had fallen off
defendant to the ground, one would expect there to be blood
pooling at the point of stabbing. Instead, there was only a
trail of small drops of blood, beginning at the top of the
Morrison's driveway where Montoya was stabbed and ending in a
large pool of blood several feet down the sidewalk where Montoya
eventually collapsed (Tr. 373-74, 381, 383-84, State's Ex. 3, 4,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
PERMITTING THE DETECTIVE TO GIVE HIS OPINION BASED
ON THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AT THE CRIME SCENE AND
THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES OF HOW THE STABBINGS
OCCURRED.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in allowing Detective Stephens to give his opinion on how the
altercation occurred because 1) the detective was not an expert
in blood spatter and accident reconstruction, and 2) the
detective did not testify from personal knowledge, but merely
related out-of-court information, i.e., hearsay, as a basis for
his recreation of the crime.

Br. App. at 32-35.

Detective Stephens' training and experience, however,
qualified him as an expert regarding the testimony he gave, which
was his interpretation of physical evidence in light of
eyewitness testimony, the type and location of the knife wounds,
and the absence of any defensive wounds on the victims or
defendant.

Also, the detective did not merely relate the hearsay

statements of eyewitnesses, but he explained the physical
evidence to the jury and how that evidence fit within the context
of the testimony of witnesses presented at trial.
A. Detective Stephen's training and experience qualified him as
an expert for the purposes for which he testified.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that "[if]
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
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fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise."

Utah R. Evid. 702 (1997).

Thus, under rule 702, an witness need not have formal training or
education before giving an expert opinion.

Rather, he or she may

qualify as an expert by virtue of his or her "experience" or
"training."

Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993);

Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah
1985).
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a
witness is adequately qualified to render an expert opinion.
Randle, 8 62 P.2d at 1337.

That determination will not be

disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.

Id.

Defendant's first challenge to Detective Stephens' opinion
testimony is a foundational one.

Defendant contends that

Detective Stephens was not a blood spatter expert or an accident
reconstructionist and that his testimony "ventured into
substantive areas of scientific evidence" which required
technical or other specialized knowledge the detective did not
possess.

Br. App. at 35.

the detective's qualifications

In other words, defendant challenges
to testify as an expert in this

case.
Defendant's argument misapprehends the nature of Detective
Stephen's testimony.

The detective did not testify as a "blood
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spatter" or "accident reconstruction" expert.
Stephens testified regarding the blood trail
pooling,

Although Detective

and the blood

he did not testify regarding any blood spatters

patterns.

or

He merely pointed out the blood trail and where it led

and the blood pooling that occurred where the two victims finally
fell.

He then explained to the jury how the blood fit in

relation to the evidence and testimony already before the jury.
The detective was also not called upon to reconstruct an
"accident."

This was a crime scene and the detective was simply

asked to interpret the physical evidence that he personally
observed in light of the testimony at trial, and to explain how
the physical evidence did or did not fit with the testimony of
the eyewitnesses.
The question, then, is not whether Detective Stephens was
qualified as an expert in "blood spatter" or in reconstructing
accidents.

The issue is whether the detective, by virtue of his

skill, experience, training, or education, had any technical or
other specialized knowledge regarding the collection and
interpretation of the type of evidence in this case such that it
could assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue,
which in this case was whether defendant acted in self-defense.
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the State laid a more
than adequate foundation showing that Detective Stephens
possessed specialized knowledge regarding the interpretation of
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the kind of physical evidence present in this case. At the time
of trial, detective had been serving on the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's homicide unit for over two years (Tr. 364). As part of
his training, Detective Stephens had attended two homicide
classes, one lasting forty hours and the other three days (Tr.
376).

The two classes included training on evidence gathering,

blood spatter or pattern identification and directionality, and
other investigative aids (Tr. 376). The detective had also
participated in over 800 case conferences with doctors and other
investigators at the State Medical Examiner's Office (Tr. 376).
In addition, Detective Stephens had learned through classes,
attending autopsies, and participating in case conferences, to
recognize and distinguish between puncture and slashing wounds
(Tr. 385-86).

The detective also knew by virtue of his training

and experience what a defensive wound was and where it would be
located (Tr. 385-88).
Clearly, the detective's training and experience was enough
to qualify him as an expert who could explain, based on the blood
trails and pooling, where the two victims were when defendant
stabbed them, that the two victims sustained puncture rather than
slashing wounds to the back, that the victims had no wounds to
the front, and that neither the victims nor the defendant had any
defensive wounds.

See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1337 (trial court did

not abuse discretion in allowing police officer to testify as
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expert in accident reconstruction where he had completed
approximately eighty hours of accident reconstruction training
and had investigated thousands and reconstructed hundreds of
traffic accidents over a period of eleven years).
The detective's training and experience also allowed him to
explain how the crime probably occurred based on the physical
evidence that he personally observed and based on the testimony
of eyewitnesses.

In short, the detective's training and

experience permitted him to state whether the physical evidence
was consistent with the testimony of the witnesses and defendant.
Given Detective Stephen's extensive experience in
investigating violent crimes, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing him to testify as an expert in this field.
B.

Detective Stephens' testimony was not based on hearsay.
Defendant next attacks the detective's expert testimony on

the ground that it was based on hearsay and merely "related outof-court information."

Defendant asserts, in effect, that the

detective had no personal knowledge regarding the matters he
testified to, but merely acted as a conduit for the admission of
hearsay evidence.
The record does not support defendant's assertion.

First,

the majority of Detective Stephens' testimony was predicated on
his personal knowledge.

As stated, the detective testified

regarding the physical evidence that he personally observed and
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to statements that defendant made to him (Tr. 366, 373-74, 381,
382-85, 387-89, 403). Second, Detective Stephens' testimony as
I
to how the stabbings occurred was based on his personal knowledge
of the physical evidence in conjunction with the

in-court

testimony of eyewitnesses.
On direct examination, Detective Stephens testified
regarding the physical evidence, i.e., the blood trail and
pooling and the type, number, and location of the stab wounds
(Tr. 366-89).

The detective testified how the stabbings

occurred, explaining that his theory was based on the physical
evidence and the statements of eyewitnesses.

On cross-

examination, the detective specified that the statements he
relied on were those of Gilger, Montoya, Rowley, Esparza,
defendant, and Eloy (Tr. 403). All of those witnesses testified
at trial, and in fact, Gilger, Montoya, Rowley, and Esparza had
already testified by the time the detective took the stand (Tr.
56, 162, 228, 295, 363). The detective was able to listen to all
the testimony because he sat at counsel table for the State (Tr.
401).

A review of Detective Stephens' testimony demonstrates

that his opinion was based not on the out-of-court statements of
eyewitnesses, but on the testimony that the jury heard at trial
(Tr. 401-69).
In sum, Detective Stephens' testimony was not based on
hearsay, but was predicated on his own personal observations and
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on the in-court statements of eyewitnesses who were subject to
cross-examination.

Consequently, defendant's claim on this point

is without merit.15
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this
Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

RA B. DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

l^cSlJ

1998, I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Appellee's Brief to Ronald J. Yengich, Counsel for
Defendant, at 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
841114.

XT^^^^A^^

15

As explained in Point II, supra, even if the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing Detective Stephens to express
an opinion regarding how the crime occurred, that error was
harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence contradicting
defendant's claim of self-defense.
42

ADDENDUM A
Statutes and Rules

76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) Under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
dXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (lXb) is a third degree felony.
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 16

gale 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
Mowing such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovexy or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the partyfromintroducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order aa it deems just under the circumstances.

Rule 19

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

400

Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the dose of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the
jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a
copy of its proposed instructions! unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall digtingmah, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions
in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the juiy. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 702

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rale is
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971). was substantially the
Cross-Referenees. — Blood tests to determine i>arentajp, expert tffimony, Si 78-25-1S
et esq., 78-46V7 to 78-46*4.0.

Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(b)(4),
UUCP.
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in deter*
mining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4.
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting
n u m ber of expert witnesses, Rule 16, UHC JP.

ADDENDUM B
Pertinent Jury Instructions

T h i r d J u d i c i a l District

NOV 1 4 1996
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

TaL
spuiy Gurk

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

The State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CASE NO: 961900205 FS

vs.
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL
Jason Joe Martinez,
Defendant.
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant Jason Joe Martinez is charged by the information
which has been duly filed with the commission of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (Two Counts).
The information alleges:
COUNT I
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, at 2706 East Bengal Blvd., in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 23, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
5, Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, Jason Joe
Martinez, a party to the offense, assaulted Brandon Gilger, and intentionally caused serious
bodily injury to Brandon Gilger;
COUNT H
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, at 2706 South East Blvd., in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 23, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
5, Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant Jason Joe
Martinez, a party to the offense, assaulted Robert J. Montoya, and intentionally caused serious
bodily injury to Robert J. Montoya.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

S

If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been stated in varying ways, no
emphasis thereon is intended, and non must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not
to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, but you are to consider
the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative
importance.

INSTRUCTION NO.

[^

"Assault" is:
(a)

an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,

to do bodily injury to another; or
(b)

a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate

force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c)

an

act,

committed

with

unlawful

force

violence, that causes bodily injury to another.

or

INSTRUCTION NO.

[ ^

A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits
assault and

(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to

another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

INSTRUCTION NO.^/
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of
Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony, as charge in Count I
of the Information, you must find from the evidence each of the
following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about September 23, 1995, in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant, Jason Joe Martinez, assaulted
Brandon Gilger; and
2.

That the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily

injury to Brandon Gilger.
If you find that the evidence establishes each of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, the evidence has failed

to establish one or more of these elements, then you must find
the defendant, Jason Martinez, not guilty.

6

INSTRUCTION NO.

Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of
Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony, as charge in Count II
of the Information, you must find from the evidence each of the
following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about September 23, 1995, in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant, Jason Joe Martinez, assaulted Robert
Montoya; and
2.

That the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily

injury to Robert Montoya.
If you find that the evidence establishes each of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, the evidence has failed

to establish one or more of these elements, then you must find
the defendant, Jason Martinez, not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^

>

When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one of your members to act as
foreperson, who, as foreperson, will preside over your deliberations.
Your verdict in this case must be either:
Guilty of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count I
of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a First Degree Felony;
or
Guilty of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count II
of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count II, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, an unanimous concurrence of all jurors is required to find a
verdict. Your verdict must be in writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your
foreman and then returned by you to this Court. When your verdict has been found, notify the
bailiff that you are readvjD report to the Court.
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Dated this fw*

day of November, 1996

FRANK
DISTRIC

0CC2if>

ADDENDUM C
Affidavit of Defense Trial Counsel

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OP UTAH, DIVISION I
STATE OP UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT BREEZE

)

vs.

)

JASON MARTINEZ

)

Case No. 961900205

)

Honorable Frank Noel

Defendant.

COMES NOW Robert Breeze being first duly sworn upon his oath
to declare as true the following:
1.

I was trial counsel for Jason Martinez in the above

captioned case.
2.

My recollection of the facts and circumstances regarding

Jury Instruction #15 is as follows:
a.

Instruction No. 15 originally appeared as State's

proposed Instruction #_L2J

, although my copy of the State's

proposed instruction were not numbered.
b.

Following the close of evidence, counsel and the

Court met in chambers to discuss instructions without a reporter
present.

When we arrived in Judge Noel's chambers the Court

already had a basic set of instructions including instructions
culled from Defendant's and Plaintiff's proposed instructions.
c.

As I recall, there was a brief exchange between

myself and prosecutor David Walsh as we entered the judge's office
wherein Mr. Walsh vaguely referred to a lesser included, 3rd degree
use of a weapon instruction.

I expressed my intent to object on
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the grounds that we hadn't had a preliminary hearing on that
charge.

I do not believe the matter was discussed further.
d.

The Court while still in chambers decided which

instruction he would give (which did not include Instruction #15)
and advised that objections could be made on the record once we got
back in Court.
e.

The Court then gave his instructions to someone for

copying at which time Judge Noel, Mr. Walsh and I returned to the
courtroom.
f.

The judge then allowed on the record objections to

instructions. I made several objections, none of which related to
No. 15, due to the fact that I was unaware at that time that
Instruction No. 15 was in the packet.

My objections came from:

notes I had made in the Judge's chambers.
g.

Our objections to instructions were noted and the

jury was brought back to the courtroom.
h.
jury.

The Court then began reading the instructions to the

I was reviewing my closing statement as the Court read the

instructions to the jury.

When the Court began reading No. 15 I

immediately noted a problem and flipped to Instruction No. 15. I
knew that this instruction should not have been included. At that
moment I considered interrupting the judge and pointing out the
error, however, I decided to wait until the instructions were
complete for a more opportune time to advise the Court of the error
because I felt, based on the vibes of the jury members, that any
interruption of the judge during instructions by the defense would

cause resentment against the defense.
review of my closing statement.

I then did a final mental

When the Court finished the

instructions Judge Noel immediately directed Mr. Walsh to commence
his closing statement. I did not make an objection to No. 15 prior
to the commencement of Mr. Walsh's closing statement.

I do not

recall whether I failed to ask for a curative instruction because
I felt that interrupting would cause bad feelings against the
defense by the jurors and that the error was not of great
significance

to our self defense

theory,

whether

I simply

overlooked the error once we were into closing arguments, whether
I made a split second decision not to object because the error was
plain and would benefit my client in the event of an adverse
verdict, or because of a combination of the above.
i. After the guilty verdicts I returned to my office to
review the file for appellate issues while everything was fresh in
my mind and clearly remember again noting Instruction No. 15 and
making plans for post trial relief at that time.

ROBERT BREEZE

State of Utah

)

ss
County of Salt Lake )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by ROBERT BREEZE on
this >^?/ft day of February, 1997.
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
NOTARY PUBLIC
DENNIS MILLER
160 E. 300 So. 2nd a
S.L.CUT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
JUNE 5,2000
STATE OF UTAH

Notary Public, State of Utah
Residing at Salt Lake County
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